HelloMavens
HelloMavens

by HelloMavens

Salesforce Security Review

A security assessment of your Salesforce environment against the Security Benchmark for Salesforce (SBS).

Prepared for
CompanyBrightline Plumbing Co.
Emailsecurity@brightlineplumbing.example
SizeSmall / mid-market
IndustryHome services / e-commerce
Regulations in scopeCCPA
Generated May 6, 2026 · SBS vd4304e18e6f3747b04b1a7097b3d03a6036e5a3f · Engine v0.0.0-alpha.10

Section 1

Executive summary

A one-page read on where you stand.

B
Overall risk grade86.9 / 100Good

See the Appendix for what the passes mean and why some controls weren't applicable →

Risk tier breakdown

Top critical findings

No Critical-tier controls failed. Strong baseline on the most sensitive controls.

Risk by business impact

  • Data breach exposure: 3 access / authentication / data-protection controls failed.
  • Compliance gap: 3 categories scored below 65 / 100 — likely weak spots in audit conversations.
  • Operational risk: 13.0% of controls couldn't be evaluated from your responses. A consultant scan would resolve them with evidence-based scoring.

Section 2

Category scorecards

One card per SBS category. Each shows the 0–100 score plus the OWASP and regulation citations relevant to that category.

Access controls
92
11 pass 1 fail
OWASP: A01:2021-Broken Access Control, A04:2021-Insecure Design, A05:2021-Security MisconfigurationRegs: 164.308(a)(4), CC6.1, CC6.3, A.5.15 +7
Authentication
71
2 pass 2 fail
OWASP: A07:2021-Identification and Authentication Failures, A01:2021-Broken Access Control, A05:2021-Security MisconfigurationRegs: 164.312(d), CC6.1, CC6.7, A.5.16 +7
Code security
100
1 pass 0 fail 3 inconclusive
OWASP: A06:2021-Vulnerable and Outdated Components, A08:2021-Software and Data Integrity Failures, A03:2021-InjectionRegs: 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(A), CC7.1, CC8.1, A.8.25 +14
Customer portals
0
0 pass 0 fail 5 N/A
OWASP: A01:2021-Broken Access Control, A04:2021-Insecure Design, A05:2021-Security MisconfigurationRegs: 164.308(a)(4), 164.312(a), CC6.1, CC6.6 +12
Data protection
100
4 pass 0 fail
OWASP: A02:2021-Cryptographic Failures, A04:2021-Insecure Design, A08:2021-Software and Data Integrity FailuresRegs: 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(A), 164.312(b), CC6.1, CC6.7 +18
Deployments
85
5 pass 1 fail
OWASP: A01:2021-Broken Access Control, A05:2021-Security Misconfiguration, A08:2021-Software and Data Integrity FailuresRegs: 164.308(a)(8), CC8.1, A.5.15, A.8.32 +16
FDNS
100
1 pass 0 fail
OWASP: A04:2021-Insecure Design, A05:2021-Security MisconfigurationRegs: 164.308(a)(8), 164.316(b), CC1.4, CC2.2 +5
FILE
100
3 pass 0 fail
OWASP: A01:2021-Broken Access Control, A04:2021-Insecure Design, A07:2021-Identification and Authentication FailuresRegs: CC6.1, CC6.6, A.5.10, A.5.13 +9
Integrations
100
4 pass 0 fail
OWASP: A03:2021-Injection, A04:2021-Insecure Design, A05:2021-Security MisconfigurationRegs: CC6.6, CC6.7, A.5.19, A.8.20 +8
MON
0
0 pass 1 fail 4 inconclusive
OWASP: A09:2021-Security Logging and Monitoring Failures, A05:2021-Security MisconfigurationRegs: 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D), 164.312(b), CC7.2, CC7.3 +7
Connected apps & OAuth
80
3 pass 1 fail
OWASP: A01:2021-Broken Access Control, A05:2021-Security Misconfiguration, A08:2021-Software and Data Integrity FailuresRegs: 164.308(a)(4), CC6.1, CC6.6, A.5.15 +9
Security configuration
50
1 pass 1 fail
OWASP: A05:2021-Security MisconfigurationRegs: 164.308(a)(8), CC7.1, A.5.36, A.8.9 +1

Section 3

Remediation detail

Every failed control with what to fix, why it matters, how to fix it, and how to verify the fix worked.

SBS-ACS-008 · High
Restrict Broad Privileges for Non-Human Identities
Failed
What's wrong

Respondent attests their non-human accounts have broader permissions than they need. Over-privileged service accounts are a leading source of breach blast-radius.

Why it matters

Without documented justification for broad non-human identity privileges, organizations lose visibility into which automated systems can bypass sharing rules or perform administrative operations. Non-human identities operate without human judgment, making over-privileged automation a high-impact target—compromised credentials can result in complete data extraction, system-wide configuration changes, or persistent backdoor access. Many non-human identities are granted excessive permissions during initial setup and never reviewed, creating long-lived security exposure that security teams cannot detect, investigate, or remediate without knowing which identities have which privileges and why.

Step-by-step fix
  1. For each non-human identity with broad privileges, evaluate whether the permission is genuinely required for the identity's function
  2. Remove broad privileges that are not necessary; replace with more granular permissions where possible
  3. For non-human identities that legitimately require broad privileges, document:
    • Specific business function requiring the permission
    • Why more granular permissions cannot satisfy the requirement
    • Business owner and technical owner
    • Approval from security or compliance team
  4. Implement a formal approval process for granting broad privileges to non-human identities
  5. Establish periodic review (at least annually) of all non-human identities with broad privileges
Validation
  1. Using the non-human identity inventory from SBS-ACS-006, identify all non-human identities
  2. For each non-human identity, query assigned permissions through profiles, permission sets, and permission set groups
  3. Flag any non-human identity with one or more of the following permissions:
    • View All Data
    • Modify All Data
    • Manage Users
    • Author Apex
    • Customize Application
    • Any permission that bypasses sharing rules or grants administrative access
  4. For each flagged identity, verify that documented business justification exists explaining why the permission is required
  5. Confirm the justification was approved by appropriate stakeholders (security, compliance, or management)
Effort: 4–8h per entityDifficulty: HardScope: entity
SBS-DEP-002 · High
Establish and Maintain a List of High-Risk Metadata Types Prohibited from Direct Production Editing
Failed
What's wrong

Respondent attests they do NOT maintain a written list of high-risk metadata types prohibited from direct production editing.

Why it matters

Without an explicit list of high-risk metadata types, organizations cannot define or enforce deployment governance boundaries—leaving critical configuration categories (Apex code, authentication settings, outbound connectivity, permissions) open to uncontrolled direct production editing. Security teams cannot distinguish between metadata that requires strict deployment controls and metadata that can be safely edited manually, resulting in inconsistent governance and gaps in change attribution. The absence of a defined list also prevents effective monitoring (SBS-DEP-003), as there is no baseline to compare against when detecting unauthorized changes.

Step-by-step fix
  1. Adopt the SBS baseline list of prohibited direct-in-production metadata changes.
  2. Add any organization-specific items or exceptions as needed.
  3. Remove modify permissions for these metadata types from all human users.
  4. Ensure all future changes to listed metadata types are performed exclusively by the deployment identity.
Validation
  1. Obtain the organization's documented list of high-risk metadata types prohibited from direct production editing.
  2. Confirm that the list, at minimum, includes all SBS baseline categories.
  3. Review the list for any documented exceptions and verify they are formally approved.
  4. Verify that only the deployment identity has modify permissions for metadata types on the list.
Effort: ~3hDifficulty: MediumScope: inventory
SBS-OAUTH-003 · High
Add Criticality Classification of OAuth-Enabled Connected Apps
Failed
What's wrong

Respondent attests they do NOT maintain a criticality classification for OAuth-enabled Connected Apps. Without it, vendor-risk reviews cannot be prioritized.

Why it matters

Without a complete inventory and criticality classification, organizations lose visibility into their third-party integration landscape—preventing effective risk assessment, prioritization of security controls, and governance of external system connectivity. Security teams cannot identify which integrations access sensitive data, scope the impact of a vendor compromise, or respond effectively to incidents involving Connected Apps. This impairs detection, investigation, and response capabilities for integration-related security events.

Step-by-step fix
  1. Add any missing OAuth-enabled Connected Apps to the system of record.
  2. Document and assign a vendor criticality rating to each Connected App based on operational importance and data sensitivity.
  3. Implement a recurring process to synchronize Connected App changes with the system of record.
Validation
  1. Retrieve a list of all Connected Apps with active OAuth configurations from Salesforce Setup.
  2. Retrieve the organization's authoritative system of record for integration and vendor management.
  3. Compare the Salesforce Connected App list to the system of record and confirm every OAuth-enabled Connected App appears in the inventory.
  4. Verify each listed Connected App has an assigned vendor criticality rating documented in the system of record.
  5. Flag any apps missing from the inventory or lacking a documented criticality rating as noncompliant.
Effort: 4–8h per entityDifficulty: HardScope: entity
SBS-SECCONF-001 · High
Establish a Salesforce Health Check Baseline
Failed
What's wrong

Respondent attests they do NOT have a written Health Check baseline. Without one, configuration drift is invisible.

Why it matters

Without a defined Health Check baseline, organizations have no authoritative reference for what their security configuration should be—making it impossible to detect drift, evaluate deviations, or determine whether current settings reflect intentional decisions or accumulated neglect. Security teams cannot assess configuration-related risk, investigate whether settings were deliberately changed, or demonstrate compliance with security requirements. The absence of a baseline also prevents effective use of Health Check deviation monitoring (SBS-SECCONF-002), as there is no standard to measure against.

Step-by-step fix
  1. Create or select a Health Check baseline (Salesforce default, SBS-recommended baseline, or a custom-defined XML).
  2. Upload the baseline XML into Setup → Health Check.
  3. Document ownership of the baseline and establish a process for periodic review and updates.
  4. Communicate the baseline's purpose and implications to system owners and security stakeholders.
Validation
  1. Navigate to Setup → Health Check and confirm that a baseline template is uploaded and active.
  2. Review the XML baseline directly (via UI or API) to verify that the baseline exists and contains intentional values rather than defaults left unexamined.
  3. Interview administrators to confirm the baseline was deliberately chosen or customized and is understood as the organization's configuration standard.
  4. If the organization lacks a baseline, flag the control as noncompliant.
Effort: ~1hDifficulty: EasyScope: org
SBS-AUTH-002 · Moderate
Govern and Document All Users Permitted to Bypass Single Sign-On
Failed
What's wrong

Respondent attests there are users permitted to bypass single sign-on without documented business reasons. SSO-bypass accounts are the canonical break-glass attack target.

Why it matters

Users permitted to bypass SSO represent exceptions to centralized identity governance. Without formal documentation and approval, these accounts can proliferate unnoticed—reducing visibility into access patterns and undermining audit readiness. However, this control provides assurance and governance rather than establishing a security boundary. Undocumented exceptions increase operational risk and reduce audit readiness but require credential compromise for direct security impact.

Step-by-step fix
  1. Create or update a formal inventory documenting all SSO-bypass users with their business justification, owner, and approval date.
  2. For any undocumented or unjustified users: assign the "Is Single Sign-On Enabled" permission via their profile or permission sets to remove SSO-bypass capability.
  3. Ensure all documented exceptions adhere to least-privilege access and strong authentication controls.
  4. Establish periodic (e.g., quarterly) review of all SSO-bypass accounts.
Validation
  1. Query all user records to identify users who do not have the "Is Single Sign-On Enabled" (PermissionsIsSsoEnabled) permission assigned through their profile or permission sets.
  2. Verify each identified user appears in the approved system-of-record inventory with documented business justification, owner, and approval.
  3. Confirm each exception is authorized for administrative or break-glass purposes only.
  4. Validate that these accounts follow strong local authentication controls (e.g., strong password policies, MFA if applicable).
  5. Flag any user without documented approval.
  6. (Optional) Download API Total Usage logs (EventLogFile - ApiTotalUsage, available in free tier of Event Monitoring) to monitor SSO bypass account activity:
    • Filter API activity by users identified as SSO bypass accounts.
    • Review frequency and timing of API calls to verify usage aligns with documented break-glass purposes.
    • Flag any SSO bypass accounts with regular or unexpected API activity for review against documented justifications.
Effort: 4–8h per entityDifficulty: HardScope: entity
SBS-AUTH-003 · Moderate
Prohibit Broad or Unrestricted Profile Login IP Ranges
Failed
What's wrong

Respondent attests at least one profile has an unrestricted login IP range (e.g., `0.0.0.0/0`) that defeats the purpose of IP allow-listing.

Why it matters

Overly broad login IP ranges effectively disable network-based access controls, allowing authentication from any location on the internet. However, exploitation requires credentials to be compromised first—this control provides defense-in-depth rather than establishing a primary security boundary. When authentication controls (SBS-AUTH-001) are enforced, IP restrictions serve as an additional layer that limits the blast radius of credential compromise.

Step-by-step fix
  1. Remove any profile login IP ranges that effectively grant unrestricted global access.
  2. Replace them with IP ranges that correspond to approved corporate networks, office locations, VPN ingress points, or other authorized infrastructure.
  3. Validate that updated network restrictions do not block legitimate access paths and that users can authenticate through sanctioned networks.
  4. Establish an internal governance process to review and approve all future additions of profile login IP ranges.
Validation
  1. Retrieve all profile login IP ranges via Setup → Profiles → Login IP Ranges or by querying the Profile metadata (loginIpRanges field) using the Metadata API.
  2. For each profile, enumerate all configured login IP ranges.
  3. Identify any ranges that:
    • Cover the entire IPv4 space, or
    • Represent effectively unrestricted access (e.g., 0.0.0.0–255.255.255.255, 1.1.1.1–255.255.255.255, or similar patterns).
  4. Confirm that all IP ranges align with organizational security policy and defined network boundaries.
  5. Flag any profile with an impermissible or overly broad range.
  6. Download API Total Usage logs (EventLogFile - ApiTotalUsage, available in free tier of Event Monitoring) to validate IP restrictions are effective:
    • Extract unique CLIENT_IP values from recent API activity.
    • Compare against documented approved organizational network ranges.
    • Identify any new or unexpected IP addresses making API calls.
    • Cross-reference unusual IPs with profile assignments to identify potential policy gaps.
Effort: 4–8h per entityDifficulty: HardScope: entity
SBS-MON-005 · Moderate
Monitor API Usage Against Limits
Failed
What's wrong

Respondent attests no continuous API limit monitoring with proactive alerting exists. A runaway integration or compromised account can exhaust the daily quota and break core business processes before being detected.

Why it matters

Failure to stay within API limits creates an immediate and severe risk to the availability of critical business operations. Exceeding the rolling 24-hour API quota blocks all further inbound requests, which effectively disables core integrations (e.g. with ERP), leading to catastrophic failures of vital business processes like order placement and resulting in direct financial loss.

Step-by-step fix
  1. Configure Salesforce's native "API Usage Notifications" in Setup and, more critically, integrate API consumption data into an external monitoring solution. Configure high-priority alerts to trigger at a proactive utilization threshold (e.g. 80-90%) before the hard limit is reached.
  2. Establish a formal, high-priority Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) to be executed upon a high-utilization alert. This SOP must clearly define and be rehearsed to:
  • Immediately identify the user, application, or integration responsible for the spike in API consumption.
  • Mandate the immediate, temporary disabling of non-critical, high-volume integrations to conserve remaining quota.
  • Outline the process for proactively requesting a temporary or permanent API quota increase from Salesforce.
  1. Following any API limit breach or near-breach, mandate a post-incident review to analyze the root cause. The outcome should be a plan to re-engineer high-volume integrations for more efficient usage (e.g. using Bulk API or other low-volume methods) to prevent recurrence.
  2. Continuous Monitoring Maintenance: Establish a mandatory, recurring (e.g. quarterly) review process to confirm the ongoing integrity and functionality of the API usage data export to the monitoring platform.
Validation
  1. Review the organization's daily API limit and current 24-hour usage in the Salesforce System Overview in Setup.
  2. Verify that a continuous monitoring solution (at minimum Salesforce's native API Usage Notifications) is implemented and active.
  3. Confirm that the monitoring solution is configured to trigger immediate, high-priority alerts at a proactive threshold (e.g. 80% or 90% utilization) before the hard limit is breached. Request evidence (e.g. rule configurations, test alerts) to support this.
  4. Examine the formal, documented incident response plan for API limit breaches. Verify the plan clearly defines:
  • The immediate triage steps to identify the runaway process or application causing the spike.
  • The mandatory, temporary mitigation steps (e.g. disabling non-critical integrations).
  • The process for escalating and requesting a temporary or permanent API quota increase from Salesforce.
  1. Review the history (e.g. for the past 12 months) of any API limit breach or near-breach incidents. Confirm that the response procedure was followed and was effective in mitigating the service disruption.
Effort: ~6hDifficulty: MediumScope: mechanism
HelloMavens

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  • Get a fixed-scope plan to close the highest-impact gaps first.
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Appendix

Methodology, disclaimer, and glossary

Methodology

Each control was evaluated against the Security Benchmark for Salesforce vd4304e18e6f3747b04b1a7097b3d03a6036e5a3f. Controls scored as pass / fail / inconclusive / not applicable. Category scores are weighted by risk tier (Critical 5, High 3, Moderate 2). Overall score is a weighted average across categories proportional to each category's share of Critical-tier and High-tier controls. Inconclusive and not-applicable controls are excluded from denominators. If any Critical-tier control failed, the overall grade is capped at C regardless of other scores.

Engine version 0.0.0-alpha.10. SBS vd4304e18e6f3747b04b1a7097b3d03a6036e5a3f. Disclaimer version 2026-05-02-placeholder-1.

Disclaimer

The HelloMavens Salesforce Security Audit produces a directional security assessment based on questionnaire responses you provide.

This report is not a substitute for a formal security audit, penetration test, or compliance certification.

HelloMavens LLC makes no warranty, express or implied, regarding the completeness, accuracy, or fitness for any particular purpose of this report.

You confirm that you are authorized to submit this information about your organization.

HelloMavens LLC will process your responses solely to generate this report and will not retain raw scan data after report generation. Aggregate, anonymized scoring data may be retained for benchmarking.

Any remediation actions you take based on this report are at your own risk and discretion.

Glossary
SBS
Security Benchmark for Salesforce — an open standard of audit-ready controls maintained at github.com/Salesforce-Security-Benchmark.
OWASP Top 10
A standard awareness document for developers and web application security maintained by the Open Web Application Security Project. The 2021 edition is referenced throughout this report.
HIPAA Security Rule
U.S. federal regulation governing security standards for protected health information.
SOC 2
Service Organization Control 2 — an audit framework focused on the AICPA Trust Services Criteria (security, availability, processing integrity, confidentiality, privacy).
Inconclusive
A control that could not be evaluated from the evidence provided (e.g. you answered "I don't know"). Inconclusive controls are excluded from scoring denominators per spec §8.
Critical-fail cap
If any Critical-tier control fails, the overall risk grade is capped at C regardless of other scores. Highlights catastrophic risk areas.
Consultant scan
An evidence-based audit run by a security consultant against your Salesforce org via the upcoming sbs-scan CLI. Resolves inconclusive controls with high-confidence findings.
Where you're already strong

What these passing controls protect against, in plain language.

Access controls

  • SBS-ACS-003 Documented Justification for `Approve Uninstalled Connected Apps` Permission

    This high-risk permission is granted only to documented, justified users, so people can't quietly self-authorize OAuth apps that bypass your Connected App governance and reach data without oversight.

  • SBS-ACS-006 Documented Justification for `Use Any API Client` Permission

    This permission, which bypasses API Access Control entirely, is granted only to justified users, so external apps can't get data access without your vetting and allowlisting first.

  • SBS-ACS-001 Enforce a Documented Permission Set Model

    Your permission set model is documented and enforced, so privilege sprawl can't accumulate quietly — every authorization construct conforms to the standard, and access reviews actually have something to compare against.

  • SBS-ACS-002 Documented Justification for All `API-Enabled` Authorizations

    Your API-enabled authorizations are tracked with documented justification, so you can see who has programmatic data access at a glance and prove every permission is intentional during audit reviews.

  • SBS-ACS-004 Documented Justification for All Super Admin–Equivalent Users

    Your super-admin–equivalent users are documented and tracked, so investigations are faster, access reviews are credible, and orphaned admin accounts can't accumulate quietly behind the scenes.

  • SBS-ACS-005 Only Use Custom Profiles for Active Users

    Regular users sit on custom profiles, not Salesforce-managed standard ones, so platform updates can't enable new permissions without your approval and least privilege is actually enforceable.

  • SBS-ACS-007 Maintain Inventory of Non-Human Identities

    You have a current inventory of non-human identities, so automated access can be reviewed, orphaned credentials can be retired, and security incidents involving integrations are actually investigable.

  • SBS-ACS-011 Enforce Governance of Access and Authorization Changes

    Access changes go through governed approval and audit, so excessive permissions can't slip in unnoticed and incident investigations have a paper trail to follow.

  • SBS-ACS-009 Implement Compensating Controls for Privileged Non-Human Identities

    Privileged non-human identities have compensating controls layered on top of credentials, so secret leakage isn't a single point of failure for your most sensitive integrations.

  • SBS-ACS-010 Enforce Periodic Access Review and Recertification

    Access is reviewed and recertified on a cadence, so privilege creep can't quietly accumulate from old roles, temporary projects, and forgotten grants — least privilege stays current over time.

  • SBS-ACS-012 Classify Users for Login Hours Restrictions

    Privileged accounts are classified for login-hours restrictions, adding a defense-in-depth layer — so even a compromised credential can't be exploited freely during off-hours when detection is thin.

Authentication

  • SBS-AUTH-001 Enable Organization-Wide SSO Enforcement Setting

    SSO enforcement is on org-wide, so users can't quietly authenticate around centralized identity management — credential-based attacks lose their direct path into your org.

  • SBS-AUTH-004 Enforce Strong Multi-Factor Authentication for External Users with Substantial Access to Sensitive Data

    MFA is enforced for external users with substantial data access, so a stolen password alone can't sign someone in — phishing and credential-stuffing lose their main path to your sensitive data.

Code security

  • SBS-CODE-004 Prevent Sensitive Data in Application Logs

    Sensitive data is kept out of application logs, so a low-privilege account with log access can't extract credentials or PII without tripping the access controls on the source objects.

Data protection

  • SBS-DATA-001 Implement Mechanisms to Detect Regulated Data in Long Text Area Fields

    You can detect regulated data in long-text fields, so PII can't accumulate in unknown locations — GDPR Right-to-Erasure and CCPA deletion requests are actually executable when they arrive.

  • SBS-DATA-003 Maintain Tested Backup and Recovery for Salesforce Data and Metadata

    Backups are tested, not just configured, so accidental deletion, malicious destruction, or configuration corruption can be recovered from with confidence rather than hope.

  • SBS-DATA-004 Require Field History Tracking for Sensitive Fields

    Field history tracking is on for sensitive fields, so unauthorized or accidental changes are detectable, investigatable, and accountable rather than silent.

  • SBS-DATA-002 Maintain an Inventory of Long Text Area Fields Containing Regulated Data

    Your inventory of regulated-data fields is current, so you know exactly where personal data lives and can enforce protection, retention, and deletion obligations without scrambling to find it.

Deployments

  • SBS-DEP-005 Implement Secret Scanning for Salesforce Source Repositories

    Secret scanning runs on your repos, so hardcoded credentials get caught before they're committed — and the supply-chain path through repository access stays closed to outsiders.

  • SBS-DEP-001 Require a Designated Deployment Identity for Metadata Changes

    Metadata changes go through a designated deployment identity, so production changes are attributable and unauthorized direct edits stand out instead of blending into routine admin activity.

  • SBS-DEP-003 Monitor and Alert on Unauthorized Modifications to High-Risk Metadata

    Unauthorized changes to high-risk metadata trigger alerts, so malicious or accidental drift gets surfaced quickly instead of persisting for weeks before being noticed.

  • SBS-DEP-004 Establish Source-Driven Development Process

    Production configuration ties back to a source-controlled approval trail, so 'what changed, when, by whom' is answerable — incident investigation has a real starting point instead of guesswork.

  • SBS-DEP-006 Configure Salesforce CLI Connected App with Token Expiration Policies

    Your CLI Connected App has token expiration policies, so a stolen laptop's token files don't grant indefinite access to production — the credential exposure window is bounded.

Foundations

  • SBS-FDNS-001 Centralized Security System of Record

    Your Salesforce security configurations, exceptions, justifications, and SBS-required inventories live in a centralized system of record, so governance survives staff turnover and audit conclusions can actually be reconstructed from durable artifacts.

File and content sharing

  • SBS-FILE-002 Require Passwords on Public Content Links for Sensitive Content

    Sensitive Public Content links are password-protected, so an intercepted or accidentally-shared URL alone isn't enough to view the content — there's an authentication layer between link possession and data exposure.

  • SBS-FILE-001 Require Expiry Dates on Public Content Links

    Public Content links carry expiry dates appropriate to the sensitivity of what they share, so a leaked or forgotten link doesn't extend exposure indefinitely — time-bounded access is governance you can actually enforce.

  • SBS-FILE-003 Periodic Review and Cleanup of Public Content Links

    Active Public Content links get reviewed and cleaned up on a defined cadence, so legacy and accidentally-shared links don't accumulate as forgotten exposure — your shared-content surface area stays bounded over time.

Integrations

  • SBS-INT-004 Retain API Total Usage Event Logs for 30 Days

    API Total Usage logs are retained for 30 days, so you have visibility into REST/SOAP/Bulk API activity — anomalous behavior is detectable and incident scope is actually determinable.

  • SBS-INT-001 Enforce Governance of Browser Extensions Accessing Salesforce

    Browser extensions accessing Salesforce go through governance, so cloned or malicious extensions can't quietly harvest session tokens or exfiltrate data from authenticated users.

  • SBS-INT-002 Inventory and Justification of Remote Site Settings

    Your Remote Site Settings inventory is documented with justification, so unvetted endpoints can't be authorized for Apex callouts and you know exactly which external services your code talks to.

  • SBS-INT-003 Inventory and Justification of Named Credentials

    Named Credentials are inventoried with justification, so undocumented integration paths can't quietly connect to insecure endpoints — every external connection is accounted for.

Connected apps & OAuth

  • SBS-OAUTH-001 Require Formal Installation of Connected Apps

    Connected Apps go through formal installation, so security configuration — refresh token lifetimes, session policies, IP restrictions — is enforced by you, not inherited from the external developer.

  • SBS-OAUTH-002 Require Profile or Permission Set Access Control for Connected Apps

    Connected Apps require explicit profile or permission set access, so a Connected App can't quietly authenticate any user — least-privilege actually applies to OAuth sessions.

  • SBS-OAUTH-004 Due Diligence Documentation for High-Risk Connected App Vendors

    High-risk Connected App vendors have documented due diligence on file, so onboarding decisions are informed and contractual obligations match the access being granted.

Security configuration

  • SBS-SECCONF-002 Review and Remediate Salesforce Health Check Deviations

    Health Check deviations get reviewed and remediated, so configuration drift doesn't quietly weaken your security posture between audits — your baseline stays meaningful over time.

What didn't apply to your org

Some controls didn't apply because of how you answered earlier in the questionnaire.

You said you don't run Experience Cloud or a Customer Portal, so customer-portal hardening controls don't apply to your org.

SBS-CPORTAL-001 — Prevent Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) in Portal Apex, SBS-CPORTAL-002 — Restrict Guest User Record Access, SBS-CPORTAL-003 — Inventory Portal-Exposed Apex Classes and Flows, SBS-CPORTAL-004 — Prevent Parameter-Based Record Access in Portal-Exposed Flows, SBS-CPORTAL-005 — Conduct Penetration Testing for Portal Security

What we couldn't determine

For these controls we don't have enough evidence to call a pass or a fail. Each one has a path to a definitive answer below.

  • SBS-CODE-001Mandatory Peer Review for Salesforce Code Changes

    You answered "I don't know" to: "Does every Apex or Lightning code change get peer-reviewed and approved before it goes to production?". A consultant scan would resolve this with evidence-based scoring.

  • SBS-CODE-002Pre-Merge Static Code Analysis for Apex and LWC

    You answered "I don't know" to: "Is there an automated security scanner (e.g., Salesforce Code Analyzer, PMD) that checks every code change BEFORE it gets merged?". A consultant scan would resolve this with evidence-based scoring.

  • SBS-CODE-003Implement Persistent Apex Application Logging

    You answered "I don't know" to: "Do you have an Apex logging framework that writes events to a permanent place (not just the temporary "debug log")?". A consultant scan would resolve this with evidence-based scoring.

  • SBS-MON-001Enable Event Monitoring Log Storage

    You answered "I don't know" to: "Have you turned on Event Monitoring log storage for every event type your security policy requires (file downloads, API calls, report exports, login activity, etc.)?". A consultant scan would resolve this with evidence-based scoring.

  • SBS-MON-002Retaining Event Logs

    You answered "I don't know" to: "Do you keep your Salesforce event logs long enough to meet your retention policy — exporting them to a SIEM or external storage when Salesforce native retention is not long enough?". A consultant scan would resolve this with evidence-based scoring.

  • SBS-MON-003Monitor for Suspicious Logins

    You answered "I don't know" to: "Do you have a monitoring system that watches for suspicious login patterns (impossible travel, anonymizing networks, off-hours access, brute-force precursors) and alerts you in real time?". A consultant scan would resolve this with evidence-based scoring.

  • SBS-MON-004Monitor for Suspicious API Activity

    You answered "I don't know" to: "Do you have a monitoring system that watches API activity for unusual patterns — mass exfiltration spikes, unexpected object access, sudden shifts from read to write or delete operations?". A consultant scan would resolve this with evidence-based scoring.